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Abstract 
This paper studies the determinants of firm location choice at the district-level in India to 
gauge the relative importance of agglomeration economies vis-à-vis good business 
environment. A peculiar characteristic of the Indian economy is that the unorganised non-
farm sector accounts for 43.2% of NDP and employs 71.6% of the total workforce. I analyse 
National Sample Survey data that covers over 4.4 million firms, in both unorganised sectors – 
manufacturing and services. The empirical analysis is carried out using count models, and I 
instrument with land revenue institutions to deal with possible endogeneity bias. I find that 
buyer-suppler linkages and industrial diversity make a district more attractive to economic 
activity, whilst the quality and level of infrastructure are also important. I conclude that 
public policy may be limited in its ability to encourage relocation of informal firms. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The informal sector1 is an important means of livelihood to millions of people in 
developing countries. Because of its very nature – it is unregulated by government – 
data collection and subsequent analysis lags far behind that for the formal sector. In 
India, the informal sector often falls outside the scope for planned development 
efforts, and thus remains in the shadows with regard to productivity, social security 
and statistics.  
This paper is a first attempt to understand the forces that drive the clustering 
of informal sector activities in India. It studies how new firms within the Indian 
unorganised sector choose to locate themselves across districts2 in the country. Using 
count models it carries out an empirical test of the decisions of individual firms. In the 
model, firms compare potential profitability as a function of observable location 
specific advantages, market access, agglomeration economies and a set of unobserved 
local attributes of the district. And so, to unpack the location decisions of unorganised 
sector firms, an econometric analysis of location patterns is carried out to identify the 
‘revealed preferences’ of firms. Firm-level data for the unorganised sector is taken 
from surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), which 
includes information on the number and type of new firms within each district.  
It is important to test whether individual firm’s decisions are based on 
agglomeration economies, or on other factors, such as good business environment – 
the latter being more amenable to change by policy than the former. In theory, if 
government is interested in encouraging industrial growth in particular regions, it 
should have a clear understanding of what factors drive firm location decisions. There 
                                                   
1 A number if countries, including India, often use the terms ‘unorganised sector’ and 
‘informal sector’ interchangeably. 
2 India is a federal union of 28 states and 7 union territories, which are further sub-divided 
into 604 districts.  
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are a few papers that have analysed the case of manufacturing firms in India (see Lall 
et al 2004, Lall and Chakravorty 2005). However, these studies concern themselves 
primarily with the formal sector. To the author’s knowledge, there has been no 
previous research that sheds any light on what factors attract smaller, unorganised 
sector firms to a location. Since the informal sector in India is a significant source of 
employment (32%) and economic growth (22.6%) in the non-farm sector, there 
remains a yawning gap in the empirical understanding of the country’s industrial 
location choices. 
While the results of the analysis provide an understanding of what drives 
clustering in informal industries in India, they also add to a rapidly growing body of 
empirical evidence that tests the theoretical implications of Krugman’s economic 
geography. This paper finds that agglomeration economies have a significant effect 
on firms’ location decisions, and that the ability of incremental policy reforms to 
counter the effects of geography may be limited. In the case of the unorganised sector, 
geography could indeed be destiny. However, the paper does not predict how 
interaction between the forces of agglomeration and good infrastructure might 
ultimately affect the distribution of economic activity across the country.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a descriptive 
overview of the clustering of informal sector activity, in both the manufacturing and 
services sectors. Section 3 starts with a theoretical explanation of the factors 
influencing the location of economic activity, and presents evidence of how these 
theories have been tested empirically in the literature. This section also provides an 
overview of how agglomeration economies may be different for services as compared 
to manufacturing. Section 4 lays out the estimation framework and discusses the main 
sources of data. Section 5 presents the results of the model. Section 6 describes the 
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identification strategy employed. Section 7 concludes and discusses the implications 
of the findings.  
 
 
2 Descriptive Analysis 
 
 
The unorganised sector in India refers to those enterprises whose activities or 
collection of data is not regulated under legal provision and/or which do not maintain 
regular accounts. These enterprises are not registered under the Factories Act of 1948. 
The Act requires all firms engaged in manufacturing to register if they employ 10 
workers or more and use power, or if they employ 20 workers or more. Thus, it can be 
reasonably assumed that all privately-owned manufacturing enterprises meeting these 
two criteria are said to be in the unorganised sector. All public sector enterprises are 
automatically assumed to be in the organised sector. Services enterprises are not 
required to register under the Factories Act (unless they happen to also be engaged in 
manufacturing activities), and thus, most privately owned services firms are officially 
classified as being in the unorganised sector. Later in the paper, I analyse enterprises 
by size to try and control for this problem of definition of what constitutes as 
unorganised for services firms.  
The terms ‘unorganised’ and ‘informal’ sector enterprises are used 
interchangeably in this paper; however, the latter are a subset of the former. The 
informal sector comprises mainly of unincorporated proprietary or partnership 
enterprises, while the unorganised sector includes the same along with cooperative 
societies, trusts and private limited companies.  
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The unorganised sector in India continues to occupy a substantial place in the 
country’s economy. Its share in the country’s Net Domestic Product (NDP) was 
56.7% in 2002-03. The importance of the unorganised sector differs substantially 
across farm and non-farm activities. For instance, in the same year, its share of 
agricultural NDP was a whopping 96%, and its share of manufacturing and services 
NDP was 39.5% and 46.9% respectively.  
The unorganised sector’s total NDP contribution can be broken down into its 
services (43.2%) and manufacturing (16.8%) components. Manufacturing enterprises 
are often registered because they require more licenses and need access to more 
infrastructure and capital. On the other hand, service activities can be undertaken 
without many of these pre-requisites. 
The importance of the unorganised sector is even starker with regards to 
employment. In 2004-05, the unorganised sector was a source of livelihood to 
approximately 86.3% of the country’s workforce. Although a large section of the 
unorganised sector works within agricultural activities, it is pertinent to note that 
71.6% of the total employment in the non-farm sector was also unorganised. In other 
words, although the unorganised sector contributes just over half of the country’s 
NDP, it employs almost 90% of its workforce.  
The contribution of the unorganised sector to employment has also remained 
broadly stable over the last few decades, with that of the formal sector rising very 
slowly over time. Informal agricultural employment has barely budged around the 
99.4 percent mark. In fact the proportion of unorganised sector employment has risen 
for all these sectors, especially for services and manufacturing by a few percentage 
points over the period of study (1983-84 to 1999-2000). Sectors like electricity, gas 
and water supply, and transport and communication have also experienced rapid 
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informalisation of the their workforce. In other words, the dominance of unorganised 
employment in the country shows no signs of abating (see Table 3).  
Over the last decade, there has been much interest in studying the location and 
the geographic concentration of economic activity. The clustering of economic 
activity has important implications for development, through its effect on employment 
and growth. The Government of India has focussed much attention on trying to 
encourage industrial activity in secondary cities or to areas where such activity has 
not previously clustered or even favoured. This effort has been focussed on organised 
sector activity. And even though the unorganised sector is of critical importance to the 
economy, there is almost no understanding of what attracts these activities to 
locations.  
Before studying the impact of various factors affecting the location of 
unorganised firms, I will establish that both sectors, manufacturing and services, show 
evidence of spatial clustering3 across different districts in India. A study of what 
drives spatial concentration of economic activity can only be interesting if such 
patterns exist in the first place.  
There are many methods to ascertain whether firms are uniformly distributed 
across various locations or if they show patterns of spatial concentration. Clustering in 
its simplest forms can be shown graphically, or through a bird’s eye view of where 
industry in located by means of geographical maps. Figure 2 provides an actual 
representation of firm density for the country – the size of the circle is proportional to 
the number of new informal firm births within the district. The total number of new 
informal manufacturing and services units exceeded 2 million respectively. The first 
map illustrates that whilst some districts in the country host a lot of new unorganised 
                                                   
3 Clustering is a phenomenon in which events or artefacts are not randomly distributed over 
space, but tend to be organised into proximate groups.  
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economic activity, others are virtually empty. Also firm births tend to cluster in the 
same geographical districts, albeit with some differences depending on the type of 
sub-sector. There are 604 districts in the country, of which informal manufacturing 
firms are present in 578 districts, and of these around 39 districts account for 50% of 
all economic activity. On the other hand, informal services firms are present in 556 
districts. Of these, around 60 districts account for 50% of all economic activity. In 
other words, new informal activity is highly concentrated within a few districts in the 
country.  
Of course one could argue that clustering in these districts is simply a factor of 
the size of the district. And so, the next set of maps carries out the same exercise, but 
after controlling for the area of the district (in 
€ 
km2), district population and distance 
from the coast – and the results show that, keeping in mind the simplest no-clustering 
(uniform distribution) benchmark, there is evidence of concentration of economic 
activity in the country. After adding controls, clustering moves from particular 
districts to clusters of districts. In other words, the per capita rate remains high for the 
densely populated districts and for their neighbouring districts (see Figure 3).  
I also calculate the Theil index for the distribution of new firms for the 
manufacturing and services’ sectors. The Theil index belongs to the family of 
generalised entropy inequality measures. The values vary between 0 and ∞, with zero 
representing an equal distribution and higher values representing higher values of 
inequality4. Figure 4 shows the contribution to the Theil index by district. These 
results correspond closely to the visual clustering presented in the maps. In other 
words, districts such as Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Ahmadabad, 
                                                   
4 The value of the index increases in the inequality of the distribution of firm births by district 
with respect to total firm births: 
€ 
T = 1N j =1
N
∑
x j
x .ln
x j
x 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ , where 
€ 
x j  is the number of firm 
births in district 
€ 
j . 
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Thane, Pune etc are agglomerated even after using different descriptive techniques to 
control for district-specific characteristics and for the size and the distribution of firms 
across districts.  
Although maps provide a convenient visual representation of the location of 
new economic activity, more detailed statistics are required to ascertain if there is any 
evidence of clustering. If economic activity of a particular industry is biased towards 
a subset of regions, then the industry is said to be ‘concentrated’; and if economic 
activity of a particular region is biased towards a subset of industries, the region is 
said to be ‘specialised’. I use the Theil index to study what regions are specialised, 
and the Ellison-Glaeser Index5 to study concentration across industries (see Appendix 
for construction of these indices). The Theil Index here provides an indication of the 
over or under-representation of district across a set of given industries, i.e. the 
distribution of new firms by NIC sector across districts. The results are provided in 
Table 4, separately for manufacturing and services sectors for district with the most 
clustering. Again, districts such as Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Bangalore, Hyderabad 
etc continue to dominate.  
Table 5 and Table 6 in provide the Ellison-Glaeser Indices for the two sectors 
across districts. The EG Index has the property of controlling simultaneously for the 
employment distribution among firms and regions. In their paper, Ellison and Glaeser 
(1997) demonstrate that the index takes the value of zero under the null hypothesis of 
random location conditional on the aggregate manufacturing employment in that 
region. In other words, the no-agglomeration benchmark is when the value of the 
index is zero (i.e. 
€ 
E(γ) = 0). In general, if the EG index is greater than 0.05, the 
industry is considered to be highly concentrated. I find that manufactures of office, 
                                                   
5 Duranton and Overman (2005) use a more distance-sensitive measure of concentration. I am 
unable to estimate their index owing to lack of micro-data on firm location.  
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accounting and computing equipment, transport and communications equipment, and 
that of leather products, among others is highly concentrated in a few districts. 
Services related to research and development, computers and supporting transport and 
other activities also shows evidence of much concentration.  
Having established that there is overwhelming evidence of clustering in 
unorganised industry across different districts in India, this paper will examine the 
factors that drive such clustering. In particular it will focus on identifying the role of 
agglomeration economies in influencing the decision of firms to cluster, i.e. to locate 
close to one another. It will examine the nature and scale of agglomeration economies 
using district and NIC 2-digit-level data for unorganised firms in India.  
 
 
3 Theoretical background and Literature 
 
 
This section will provide a brief overview of the theoretical understanding of 
agglomeration economies and outline a few empirical studies of relevance. For an 
excellent overview of the location theory, see Brulhart (1998) (Table 1, Page 778) that 
describes the different theoretical schools and lists their principal distinguishing 
features. Marshall (1919) was the first to identify the benefits from industrial 
clustering. Clusters of firms, predominantly in the same sector, could take advantage 
of localisation economies, such as the sharing of sector-specific inputs, skilled labour 
and knowledge. Thus, cost-saving externalities are maximised when a local industry 
is specialised. The Marshall-Arrow-Romer (Marshall 1890, Arrow, 1962, Romer 
1986) models predict that such externalities predominantly occur within the same 
  11 
industry. Therefore, if an industry is subject to localisation externalities, firms are 
likely to locate in a few regions where other firms that industry are already clustered. 
The next level is that of inter-industry clustering6, i.e. when firms in a given 
industry and those in related industries agglomerate in a particular location. The 
benefits of clustering would include inter-industry linkages, buyer-supplier networks, 
and opportunities for efficient sub-contracting. Venables (1996) demonstrates that 
agglomeration could occur through the combination of firm location decisions and 
buyer-supplier linkages, since the presence of local suppliers could reduce transaction 
costs and increase profitability. Inter-industry linkages can also serve as a channel for 
vital information transfers.  
An overall large size of the urban agglomeration and its more diverse industry 
mix is also thought to provide external benefits beyond those realised within a single 
sector or due to a tight buyer-supplier network (Henderson 2003). Chinitiz (1961) and 
Jacobs (1969) proposed that important knowledge transfers primarily occur across 
industries and the diversity of local industry mix is important for these externality 
benefits. These benefits are typically called urbanisation economies and include 
access to specialised financial and professional services, availability of a large labour 
pool with multiple specialisations, inter-industry information transfers and the 
availability of less costly general infrastructure. Larger cities also provide a larger 
home market for end products, make it easier to attract skilled employees. Other 
factors that make big cities more attractive are urban amenities not available in 
smaller towns and a large number of complementary service providers such as 
financial and legal advisers, advertising and real estate services etc. 
                                                   
6 As Deichmann et al (2005) points out, empirically the distinction between own-industry 
versus cross-industry is dependent on the level of sectoral aggregation.  
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Thus, industrial clustering could take place at different levels, which would 
have different implications for the associated agglomeration economies. A firm could 
gain from economies of agglomeration that arise from localisation economies, that 
occur as a result of concentration of firms within the same industry; inter-industry 
economies, that occur as a result of concentration of firms in related industries in a 
particular area; and urbanisation economies, that occur across all industries as a result 
of the scale of a city or region by means of its large markets and urban diversity. It is 
also pertinent to note that localisation, inter-industry and urbanisation economies are 
not mutually exclusive – they may occur individually or in combination.  
In the empirical literature, there are two broad approaches to identify the 
determinants of firms’ location decisions. One is survey-based or the ‘stated 
preference’ approach’, for instance to ask firms directly, through an investment 
climate survey, for instance, about what location factors are important to them. The 
second approach is a modelling approach or an econometric analysis of empirical 
patterns used to identify ‘revealed preferences’ based on the characteristics of the 
region.  
To my knowledge, there are no empirical tests in the literature on factors that 
could drive the location decisions of informal activity. The established research looks 
mainly at the formal sector – whether for manufacturing, or services or both. For 
instance, with regards to formal manufacturing in India, Lall and Meningstae (2005) 
analyse the productivity of plants sampled from 40 of the country’s largest industrial 
cities and found that differences in clustering across locations were explained by 
market access, labour regulation and the quality of power supply. With regards to 
foreign entrants into domestic manufacturing sectors, Head and Reis (1996) show that 
foreign firms in China preferred to locate in cities where other foreign firms are 
located. In their paper Head and Mayer (2004) show that downstream linkages made 
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regions in Europe more attractive to Japanese investors, but the paper does not 
account for access to suppliers. Cheng and Kwan (2000), and Amiti and Javorcki 
(2005) also confirm that regional markets and buyer-supplier linkages were important 
factors affecting the location decisions of foreign firms.  
Services firms are theorised to be different from manufacturing. For instance, 
in some services, product specialisation, rather than standardisation, may be more 
important in capturing markets (Enderwick 1989), and proximity to competitors, 
suppliers and markets may be significant determinants relative to agglomeration 
economies (Bagchi-Sen 1995).  And with the introduction of new communication 
technologies and the ability to slice the service production chain more thinly, it could 
be argued that proximity would cease to be an important factor in explaining 
agglomeration economies. Earlier research conducted in North America (Kirn 1987 
for the US, and Coffey and McRae 1989 for Canada) found that producer services did 
not necessarily follow population and manufacturing location patterns – they could 
locate in peripheral regions and develop an export base. However, more recent 
research (Dekle and Eaton 1999, Coffey and Shearmur 2002) found evidence that the 
agglomeration economies exerted a stronger influence in services than in 
manufacturing, in spite of advances in information and communications technology.  
There are a number of reasons why informal activities are different from the 
formal economy – they are usually an extension of the household economy and start-
ups that require little or no capital investment. Informal sector enterprises in India 
comprise of unregulated micro-enterprises, the bulk of which employ less than five 
workers, and all of which employ less than 50 workers. Examples of such enterprises 
are those that produce bidis (Indian cigarettes), small piece-rate suppliers to the 
textile, weaving or footwear sectors, small shopkeepers etc. The informal sector is 
also the largest employer of rural migrants in big cities like Mumbai, Kolkata and 
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Delhi, and like in other countries, the sector serves as the only source of employment 
to those who are unable to find work in the formal economy. Thus, small enterprises 
have been viewed as an important means of promoting industrialisation and 
employment in poor countries.  
McGee (1977) noted that the informal sector in South-East Asian cities tended 
to concentrate in areas of dense population such as nodes of transportation, or where 
adjacent activities are entertainment complexes, public markets and also in those 
localities where they could benefit from product complementarities and mutual 
customer attraction. A priori, there is no reason to assume that informal sector activity 
remains unaffected by agglomeration economies. Indeed, it could be hypothesised 
that in the absence of access to formal credit facilities, or alternatively since they are 
untouched by changes in regulations, the importance of buyer-supplier linkages and 
informal networks of social interaction could be more important to them than to firms 
operating in the organised sector. The informal sector in India largely ignores labour 
regulations, officially recognised collective bargaining processes, taxes or 
institutional obligations. There is some research (Marjit and Kar 2009) to show that 
informal manufacturing and self-employed units accumulate fixed assets and invest 
and that often they are able to do so in times when their formal counterparts are mired 
in complex regulations. 
Production in the formal sector is also dependent on subcontracting among 
informal firms specialised in some aspect of the vertical production chain. Although 
parts of the unorganised sector pertain mostly to the production of non-tradables in 
the economy (think of street vendors and domestic help) they are also an important 
input to the production of intermediate goods, processed exports and import 
substitutes, supported by supply side contracts with the formal sector. For instance, 
informal carpet weavers in Agra operate alongside larger, more formal carpet 
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designers and exporting firms in the city. And to the extent that the informal sector is 
linked to its formal counterpart, wages in the sector could be affected structural 
changes in the formal industrial sector.  
With the theoretical and empirical literatures in mind, this paper will 
concentrate on the extent to which agglomeration economies matter to informal firms’ 
location decisions, and compare them to those in the formal sector. The next section 
will describe the estimation framework employed and them move on to discussing the 
results and possible endogeneity bias.  
 
 
4 Estimation Framework 
 
 
4.1 Econometric model 
 
 
A popular model of location choice are conditional logits which assume that a firm 
evaluates alternative locations at each time period, and would consider relocation if its 
profitability in another place exceeded that at its current location7. The use of a 
discrete choice framework to model location behaviour stretches back to the 1970s, 
when Carlton (1979) adapted and applied McFadden’s (1974) Random Utility 
Maximiation Framework to firm location decisions.  
Within such a discrete choice framework, a general profit function is used to 
explain how new firms choose a location. Following McFadden the model assumes a 
set  of possible locations (districts) assuming that location  offers 
                                                   
7 In reality, relocation can be costly and firms need to take account of sunk investments in 
production capacity, and other costs of moving. However, these relocation costs are not 
considered in the model.  
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profitability level 
€ 
π ijk  to a firm 
€ 
i  in industry . The resulting profitability equation 
yielded by location  to a firm 
€ 
i  in industry  is: 
 
€ 
π ijk = βZijk + ξ j +ε ijk         (1) 
 
where 
€ 
β is the vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated,  measures 
unobserved characteristics of the district which can affect the firm’s profitability and 
€ 
ε ijk is a random term. Thus, the profit equation is composed of a deterministic and a 
stochastic component. Under the assumption of independent and identically 
distributed error terms 
€ 
ε ijk, with type I extreme-value distribution, then it can be 
assumed that the ith firm will choose district j if 
€ 
π j
i ≥π l
i
 for all l, where l indexes all 
the possible location choices to the ith firm. Thus, the probability that any firm will 
choose to locate in a district j is given by: 
 
 
€ 
pijk (π ij ≥π il∀l ≠ j) =
eβZ ijk
eβZ ijk
m=1
J
∑
      (2) 
 
where 
€ 
pijk  is the probability that firm 
€ 
i  in industry 
€ 
k  locates in district 
€ 
j . If we let 
€ 
dijk =1 if firm 
€ 
i  of industry 
€ 
k  picks location 
€ 
j , and 
€ 
dijk = 0  otherwise, then we can 
write the log likelihood of the conditional logit model as follows: 
 
€ 
logLcl = dijk log pijk
j=1
J
∑
k=1
K
∑
i=1
N
∑         (3) 
 
In practice, however, the implementation of the conditional logit model in the face of 
a large set of spatial alternatives is very cumbersome8. The conditional logit model is 
also characterised by the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). 
                                                   
8 Guimaraes et al. (2003) provide an overview of the problems and how different researchers 
have attempted to deal with them in the past.  
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Consequently, the ratio of the logit probabilities for any two alternatives does not 
depend on any alternatives other than the two considered. More formally, this implies 
that the ε ijks are independent across individual firms and choices; all locations would 
be symmetric substitutes after controlling for observables. This assumption would be 
violated if districts within particular states were closer substitutes than others outside 
of the state boundary. The addition of dummy variables for each individual choice 
would effectively control for choice specific unobservables, amounting to the 
following specification:  
 
π ijk = δ j + βZijk + ξ j +ε ijk         (4) 
 
where s are the alternative specific constants introduced to absorb factors that are 
specific to each particular choice. In this case all explanatory variables (observable or 
unobservable) that only change across choices are absorbed by the alternative specific 
constants. In the presence of large datasets, such as the one I plan on using, this 
implementation would be impractical because of the large number of parameters to be 
estimated. And this would still leave the problem of the IIA unsolved.  
As an econometric alternative, it can be shown (Guimaraes et al 2003) that the 
implementation of conditional logit models yields identical results to Poisson 
regression models when the regressors are not individual specific. They demonstrate 
how to control for the potential IIA violation by making use of an equivalence 
relation between the conditional logit and Poisson regression likelihood functions. In 
a separate paper, Guimaraes et al (2004) provide an empirical demonstration. In this 
model the alternative constant is a fixed-effect in a Poisson regression model, and 
coefficients of the model can be given an economic interpretation compatible with the 
Random Utility Maximisation framework. Since using both models yield identical 
parameter estimates, I will use Poisson regressions to generate coefficients. See 
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Mukim and Nunnenkamp (2010) for a comprehensive list of empirical papers that use 
Poisson models and those that use conditional logits.  
Guimaraes et al (2003) show that Equation (3) is equivalent to that of a 
Poisson model that takes the number of new firms in a district, nijk , as the dependent 
variable and includes a set of location-specific explanatory variables. The same results 
will be obtained if we assume that nijk  follows a Poisson distribution with expected 
value equal to: 
 
E(nijk) = λijk = exp(αdijk + βZijk )       (5) 
 
where [α,β] is the vector of parameters to be estimated and dijk  is a vector of K  
dummy variables, each one assuming the value 1 if the observation belongs to 
industry k . Thus, the above problem can be modelled as a Poisson regression where 
the [α,β] vector can be estimated regardless of the number of  parameters.  
To sum up, I test the importance of economic geography and locational factors 
by implementing a count model, wherein the count of new firms within a location is 
modelled as a function of factors common to the location and those common to 
particular sectors within a location. The original estimation framework is based on a 
location decision model in which individual firms compare profitability across 
different locations.   
 
4.2 Specification of variables 
 
 
The deterministic component of the function consists of the various attributes of the 
location that can influence the profitability of a firm in that particular location, and the 
random component consists of the unobserved characteristics of the location, and 
measurement errors. The dependent variable in the model is the count of new informal 
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informal firms at time 
€ 
t , whilst all the explanatory variables in the model are defined 
at time 
€ 
t −1. Section 4.3 below describes the sources of data and the cross-sectional 
time period for manufacturing and services firms in detail.  
 
The observables in this model are given by: 
€ 
Zijk :σ jk,Λkj ,U j ,MAj ,Ed j ,X j ,W j ,WE j  
 
Where: 
  represents localisation economies, represented by the share of firms in industry k 
found in location j 
 represents inter-industry trading relations measured by the strength of buyer-
supplier linkages 
 represents urbanisation economies in location j 
 summarises access to markets in neighbouring districts 
Other district-level characteristics include: 
 measures the level of human capital in location j 
 captures the quality and availability of infrastructure (electricity and 
communications) 
  a vector of factor input price variables in location j 
€ 
WE j  captures the level of wealth) in location j 
 measures unobserved characteristics of the district which can affect the firm’s 
profitability. Each firm considers these factors at the time it is making its location 
decision, but these are not captured in the data. The specifics of the endogeneity 
problem are dealt with in more detail in Section VI.  
The economic geography variables in this model are represented by market 
access ( ), localisation economies ( ), inter-industry economies ( ) and 
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urbanisation economies ( ). The variables representing business environment are 
 (educational attainment)  (quality and availability of power and 
communications’ infrastructure) and 
€ 
WE j  (wealth). The remainder of this section 
provides a detailed description of each of the variables used in the model.  
Localisation economies ( ) can be measured by own industry employment 
in the region, own industry establishments in the region, or an index of concentration, 
which reflects disproportionately high concentration of the industry in the region in 
comparison to the nation. I measure localisation economies as the proportion of 
sector k’s employment in district j as a share of all of sector k’s total employment in 
the country. The higher this value, the higher the expectation of intra-industry 
concentration benefits in the district. 
 
 
 
There are several approaches for defining inter-industry linkages: input-output based, 
labour skill based and technology flow based. Although these approaches represent 
different aspects of industry linkages and the structure of a regional economy, the 
most common approach is to use the national level input-output accounts as templates 
for identifying strengths and weaknesses in regional buyer-supplier linkages (Feser 
and Bergman 2000). The strong presence or lack of nationally identified buyer-
supplier linkages at the local level can be a good indicator of the probability that a 
firm is located in that region. To evaluate the strength of buyer (supplier) linkages for 
each industry, a summation of regional (here district) industry employment weighted 
by the industry’s input (output) coefficient column (row) vector from the national 
input-output account is used: 
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€ 
Λkj = wkekj
k=1
n
∑  
 
where, is the strength of the buyer (supplier) linkage, 
€ 
wk  is industry k’s national 
input (output) co-efficient column (row) vector and 
€ 
ekj  is total employment for 
industry k in district j. The measure examines local level inter-industry linkages based 
on national input-output accounts. The national I-O coefficient column vectors 
describe intermediate goods requirements for each industry, whilst the I-O coefficient 
row vectors describe final good sales for each industry.  Assuming that local 
industries follow the national average in terms of their purchasing (selling) patterns of 
intermediate (final) goods, national level linkages can be imposed to the local level 
industry structure for examining whether district j has a right mix of buyer-supplier 
industries for industry k. By multiplying the national I-O coefficient vector for 
industry k and the employment size of each sector in district j, simple local 
employment numbers can be weighted based on what industry k purchases or sells 
nationally.  
I use the Herfindal measure to examine the degree of economic diversity, as a 
measure of urbanisation ( ) in each district. The Herfindal index of a district j ( ) 
is the sum of squares of employment shares of all industries in district j: 
 
 
 
Unlike measures of specialisation, which focus on one industry, the diversity index 
considers the industry mix of the entire regional economy. The largest value for is 
one when the entire regional economy is dominated by a single industry. Thus a 
higher value signifies lower level of economic diversity.  
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In principle, improved access to consumer markets (including inter-industry 
buyers and suppliers) will increase the demand for a firm’s products, thereby 
providing the incentive to increase scale and invest in cost-reducing technologies. The 
proposed model will use the formulation proposed initially by Hanson (1959), which 
states that the accessibility at point 1 to a particular type of activity at area 2 (say, 
employment) is directly proportional to the size of the activity at area 2 (say, number 
of jobs) and inversely proportional to some function of the distance separating point 1 
from area 2. Accessibility is thus defined as the potential for opportunities for 
interactions with neighbouring districts and is defined as: 
 
€ 
MAj =
Sm
d j−mbj
∑  
 
Where, is the accessibility indicator estimated for location j, is a size 
indicator at destination m (in this case, district population), is a measure of 
distance between origin j and destination m, and b describes how increasing distance 
reduces the expected level of interaction9. The size of the district 
€ 
j  is not included in 
the computation of market access – only that of neighbouring districts is taken into 
account10. The accessibility indicator is constructed using population (as the size 
indicator), distance (as a measure of separation) and is estimated without exponent 
values. The market access measure has been constructed by allowing transport to 
occur along the orthodromic distance11 connecting any two districts within a 500-
kilometre radius.  
                                                   
9 In the original model proposed by Hanson (1959), b is an exponent describing the effect of 
the travel time between the zones.  
10 The final specification includes population to control for the size of district 
€ 
j . 
11 Also known as great-circle distance, it is the shortest distance between any two points on 
the surface of a sphere. 
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A distinguishing feature of my approach to evaluating the factors that drive 
firms to locate in particular districts is that I make use of data on education. I assess 
quantitatively the role played by the human capital across different districts on the 
decisions of firms across different industries to situate themselves in a particular 
district. I include a measure of the effect of education, captured by the education 
variable - . This is defined as the proportion of the population within the district 
with a high-school education.  
I define as a measure of ‘natural advantage’ through the embedded quality 
and availability of infrastructure in the district. I use the availability of power (proxied 
by the proportion of households with access to electricity) within a location as an 
indicator of the provision of infrastructure. In addition I also use the proportion of 
households within a district with a telephone connection as an indicator of 
communications’ infrastructure.  
 is an indicator of input costs in location j, and is given by nominal district-
level wage rates (i.e. non-agricultural hourly wages). The expected effect of this 
variable is hard to pin down theoretically. On the one hand, if wages were a measure 
of input costs then one would expect informal activity to be inversely related to 
wages, since high costs within a location would make it less attractive. However, it is 
also important to control for the skill set of the workers since a positive coefficient on 
wages could be proxying for more skilled-labour. In theory, workers with higher 
ability could demand a higher wage rate and in turn enjoy a higher level of 
consumption. Although I am unable to directly control for the ability of the worker, I 
include ‘education’ as a proxy for the level of human capital within the district. And 
thus, the proportion of high-income households (
€ 
WE j ) within a district is an indicator 
of the general level of wealth, or more specifically, consumer expenditure within a 
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district. The variable is constructed using household consumption data and refers to 
those households that belong to the highest monthly per-capita consumption 
expenditure group12.  
 
4.3. Data Sources 
 
The dependent variable, used in the reduced form estimation, is the count of new 
firms within the informal sector in India – in the manufacturing and in the services 
sector. The data is drawn from the Fifty-Seventh Round (July 2001-June 2002: 
Unorganised Service Sector) and the Sixty-Second Round (July 2005-June 2006: 
Unorganised Manufacturing Enterprises) of the National Sample Survey 
Organisation. The former household survey contains data on services enterprises in 
the informal sector (NIC division 38-97), and the latter on manufacturing enterprises 
in the informal sector (NIC division 15-37). Enterprises are divided into (1) own 
account enterprises, which are normally run by household labour and which do not 
hire outside labour on a regular basis, (2) non-directory establishments, which employ 
one to five workers (including household and hired taken together) and (3) directory 
establishments, which employ six or more workers (including household and hired 
taken together). 
I extract data on new firms from the question that asks the enterprise its status 
over the last 3 years (expanding/stagnant/contracting/operated for less than 3 years). I 
select enterprises that respond in the positive to the latter option, in each of the two 
surveys. The surveys also contain data on the district within which the enterprise is 
located. The total number of new services firms counted within the 1999 survey 
                                                   
12 The actual MPCE category differs depending on the year of the survey, the type of district 
(rural or urban) and the population of the district. 
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equals 2,409,204 and the count of new manufacturing firms for the 2004 survey is 
2,041,137. In short, I carry out two separate cross-sections, one for unorganised 
manufacturing firms and the other for unorganised services firms. Since the surveys 
sample different firm populations, I am do not exploit changes between the two 
rounds – however, I am interested in looking at what factors drive unorganised 
manufacturing and/or services firms to a district.  
The choice of years is dictated by the data. Whilst data on the dependent 
variable is drawn from the NSSO Rounds described above, I extract data from the 
Employment and Unemployment Surveys - Round 55.10 (July 1999 – June 2000) and 
Round 61.10 (July 2004 – June 2005). The former is the source of explanatory 
variables for the cross-sectional analysis for services, and the latter for manufacturing. 
This data, which is disaggregated by industry and district, allows me to construct my 
agglomeration variables. It is important to keep in mind that since employment data is 
taken from household surveys, it includes employment within the economy as a 
whole, and does not differentiate between the formal and the informal sector. In other 
words, the construction of localisation, input-output and urbanisation economies 
already assumes linkages between the organised and unorganised sectors. Data on 
education, electricity and communications infrastructure, and on wages and wealth 
within the district are also drawn from the household surveys. I use population data 
from the 2001 Census to construct the market access variable.  
 
 
 
5 Results and Discussion 
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I start with an illustration of the characteristics of the data to explain my modelling 
choices. The first observation is that the data is over-dispersed. In Table 9, the mean 
number of new firms per district is around 4,111 for the services sector, and 3,531 for 
the manufacturing sector. At the same time the respective standard deviations are 
around 1.6 to 2.3 times the mean. A Poisson model implies that the expected count, or 
mean value, is equal to the variance. This is a strong assumption and does not hold for 
my data. A frequent occurrence with count data is an excess of zeroes – in this case, 
however, this is not a significant problem. Only 29 districts (of a total of 586) have 
zero new services units, and 52 districts (of a total of 578) have zero new 
manufacturing units.  
I also check the suitability of the different types of models with regards to 
their predictive power. ‘Obs’ refers to actual observations in the data, and Fit_p, 
Fit_nb and Fit_zip refer to the predictions of the fitted Poisson, negative binomial and 
zero-inflated Poisson models respectively. Of all the locations in the sample, 4.9% 
have no new services units, and 9% have no new manufacturing units. In both cases, 
the Poisson model (Fit_p) predicts that 0% of all districts would have no new units – 
clearly the model underestimates the probability of zero counts. The negative 
binomial (Fit_nb), which allows for greater variation in the variable than that of a true 
Poisson, predicts that 0.66% and 3.25% of all districts will have no new services or 
manufacturing units respectively. One could also assume that the data comes from 
two separate populations, one where the number of new firms is always zero, and 
another where the count has a Poisson distribution. The distribution of the outcome is 
then modelled in terms of two parameters – the probability of always zero and the 
mean number of new firms for those locations not in the always zero group. The 
Zero-inflated Poisson (Fit_zip) predicts that 2.5% and 8.42% of all districts will have 
no new services or manufacturing units, much closer to the observed value.   
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An alternative approach to the zero-inflated Poisson is to use a two-stage 
process, with a logit model to distinguish between the zero and positive counts, and 
then a zero-truncated Poisson or negative binomial model for a positive counts. For 
this data, this would imply using a logit model to differentiate between districts that 
have no new firms and those that do, and then a truncated model for the number of 
districts that have at least one new firm. These models are referred to as ‘hurdle 
models’ – a binary probability model governs the binary outcome of whether a count 
variate has a zero or positive realisation; if the realisation is positive, the ‘hurdle’ is 
crossed and the conditional distribution of the positives is governed by a truncated-at-
zero count model data model (McDowell 2003).  
The response variable is ‘count’, i.e. the number of new firms per district. The 
Poisson regression models the log of the expected count as a function of the predictor 
variables. More formally,
€ 
β = log(µx+1) − log(µx ) , where 
€ 
β is the regression 
coefficient, 
€ 
µ  is the expected count and the subscripts represent where the regressor, 
say 
€ 
x , is evaluated at 
€ 
x  and at 
€ 
x +1 (here implying a unit percentage change in the 
regressor13). Since the difference of two logs is equal to the log of their quotient, i.e. 
€ 
log(µx+1) − log(µx ) = log(
µx+1
µx
), thus one could also interpret the parameter estimate as 
the log of the ratio of expected counts. In this case, the count refers to the ‘rate’ of 
new firms per district. The coefficients14 could also be interpreted as incidence rate 
ratios (IRR), i.e. the log of the rate at which events occur.  
The IRR score can be interpreted as follows: if localisation were to increase by 
a percentage unit, the rate ratio for the count of new manufacturing firms would be 
                                                   
13 This is because the regressors are in logarithms of the original independent variables. 
14 The non-exponentiated coefficient results can be made available on request. 
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expected to decrease by a factor of 0.382, i.e. by 61.815 percentage points (see the 
coefficient of localisation in model 3 in Table 10). In other words, if input linkages 
were to increase by a percentage point, the rate ratio for the count of new services 
firms would be expected to increase by a factor of 1.247 i.e. by 24.7 percentage points 
(see the coefficient on input in model 3 in Table 11) 
More simply, an incidence rate ratio equal to 1 implies no change, less than 1 
implies a decrease and more than 1 implies an increase in the rate ratio. As the model 
selection criteria I also examine and compare the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC). Since the models are used to fit the 
same data, the model with the smallest values of the information criteria is considered 
better. I also control for the size of the district (population), and the total employment 
within the district (wherever possible) and include state dummies. The economic 
geography variables are represented by localisation, input, output, urbanisation and 
market access, whilst business environment variables are represented by education, 
telephone, electricity, wages and wealth. The results of zero-truncated negative 
binomial models (for both manufacturing and services), which have the best 
goodness-of-fit statistics, are provided in Table 10 and Table 11 – results from the 
other models are presented in Table 12 and Table 13.  
Localisation has a negative and significant effect – since localisation refers to 
the clustering of firms within the same industry within a location, this could be 
evidence that clustering leads to competition of firms within the same industry. 
Linkages to final goods’ suppliers have a positive and significant effect on the 
attractiveness of a district to new informal manufacturing activity. On the other hand, 
it is not clear why such firms seem to have a negative association with regards to co-
                                                   
15 0.618 = 1 – 0.382 
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location with intermediate goods’ buyers. Market access, i.e. being located close to 
larger, more populated districts again seems to have no effect on how attractive a 
district is to informal manufacturing activity. 
With regard to business environment variables, the effect of education and 
telecommunications infrastructure seems to be insignificant. The negative coefficient 
(0.622<1) on electricity could be explained by the phenomenon of manufacturing 
subsidising residential power in many parts of the country, and the presence of more 
households with access to power could potentially increase the costs of subsidisation 
for the manufacturing sector. Wages also seem to be unrelated to a location’s 
attractiveness – as mentioned before I am unable to directly account for the skill set of 
the worker. However, I do include the proportion of wealthy households within the 
district as a control – this would allow me to control for the ability of some workers to 
demand higher wages, and also provide an indication of the demand within a district. 
Since I control for the general quality of human capital within the district, I interpret 
the positive and significant coefficient on wealth as informal manufacturing activity 
being attracted to districts with higher consumption expenditures.  
The results for informal service firm births show that the higher the intra-
industry concentration, the lower the attractiveness of the location. Since informal 
services refer mainly to small shopkeepers and households providing services, this 
means that localisation may be capturing the effect of competition within a location. 
The effect of input linkages is positive and significant across different models 
implying that informal services tend to be attracted to those industries that they supply 
to. In the case of services, unlike manufacturing, new units are also attracted to their 
intermediate goods’ industries (1.169>1). Industrial diversity within a district seems 
to have a negative and significant effect - recall that since a higher Herfindahl index 
implies lower industrial diversity, the direction of the sign of the coefficient could be 
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evidence of a positive association between more industrial diversity and more profits, 
or greater attractiveness of the district.  
With regard to the business environment, access to electricity has a positive 
and significant effect, whilst education and communications infrastructure do not 
seem to matter much. The size of the district, i.e. population, strongly attracts 
informal services activity. This is intuitive since one would expect clustering from 
personal consumer services (such as hairdressers, or rickshaw drivers) that supply the 
final demands for consumers and thus need to be located close to urban populations. 
The total level of employment, both in formal and informal activity, within a district, 
on the other hand, has a negative effect and is somewhat significant.   
In summary, the effects of localisation and input-linkages, and the absence of 
the effects of education or communications, are broadly stable across different models 
employed for both the manufacturing and the services sector (see Appendix C). 
Access to power seems to matter negatively for manufacturing, and positively for 
services. The size (i.e. population) of the district also makes a location more attractive 
to informal activity.  
 
 
6 Endogeneity Issues, Robustness and Other Exercises 
 
 
Although all the regressors have been lagged, there could remain endogeneity 
concerns that would bias the coefficients (or, in this case, the reported incidence rate 
ratios). The underlying assumption within the model is that if a particular location 
offers some inherent features that improve the profitability of certain economic 
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activities, firms will be attracted to that location. Such inherent features may be 
related to natural endowments or regulatory specificities, but they could also have to 
do with essentially un-measurable factors such as local business cultures. How to 
isolate the effect that runs from agglomeration to performance thus represents a 
considerable challenge.  With regard to the proposed analysis, the presence of these 
unobservable sources of a location’s natural advantage complicates the estimation 
procedure, particularly in identifying the contribution of production externalities to 
the location decision of firms.  
Ellison and Glaeser (1997) point out that the effects of unobservable sources 
of ‘natural advantage’ (i.e. positive values of ) will not be separately identified 
from those of production externalities between firms that arise simply from firms 
locating near one another. Simply including the number of firms or employment in a 
particular industry, which is a commonly used indicator in empirical studies 
evaluating localisation economies, will not be able to distinguish whether firms are 
attracted by a common unobservable, whether they derive benefits from being located 
in close proximity to one another, or whether it is some combination of the two. As it 
is impossible to get data on all the factors relevant to a firm’s location decision, it 
would be helpful to find an instrument for own industry concentration that is not 
correlated with the unobservable sources of natural advantage . 
I follow the identification strategy used by Lall and Mengistae (2005) who 
address this problem by using historic land revenue institutions, set up by the British 
and detailed by Bannerjee and Iyer (2005), as instruments. Land revenue was the most 
important source of government revenue and the British instituted three systems 
defining who was responsible for paying the land taxes. These were (a) landlord 
based systems (zamindari), (b) individual cultivator-based systems (ryotwari) or (c) 
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village-based systems (mahalwari). These institutions are of interest to the analysis 
for a three reasons. First, the British decision on which land tenure system to adopt 
depended more on the preferences of individual administrators rather than a 
systematic evaluation of region-specific characteristics. Thus, the choice of 
institutional arrangements is largely exogenous to regional attributes. Second, 
landlords were allowed to extract as much as they wanted from their tenants, thus 
making their behaviour predatory, leading to high inequality and low general 
investment in their districts. Further, as most wealthy landlords were not cultivators 
themselves, this reduced pressure on the state to deliver services important to farmers 
as well as general public goods. Third, rural institutions have considerable bearing on 
urban and industrial development. Rural class structures and social networks do not 
disappear once people move to cities. Thus, these land-tenure systems serve as good 
instruments since they have been found to influence agricultural investment, 
profitability and general industrialisation in the post-independence period, and since 
the choice of institution was largely exogenous, they are not correlated with any 
observable features of the underlying natural geography of the region.  
However, it should be noted that land revenue institutions are not perfect 
instruments. These institutions had long-lasting effects on many aspects of the district, 
not only on its general level of industrialisation. Thus, all measures of agglomeration - 
localisation, input-output and urbanisation - could be treated as endogenous. In 
theory, these institutions could also serve as an instrument for the level of educational 
attainment or of power infrastructure within the district.  
Following Lall and Mengistae (2005), I link Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) land 
revenue classification with the 1991 district boundaries and code the cities according 
to if the district had a landlord-based system or a village/cultivator-based system. I 
then use instrumental variable techniques in my estimation, and in separate 
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specifications, I instrument localisation and urbanisation with the choice of land 
revenue system. I run the instrumental variable estimation within a count data model 
(Mullahy 1997) using a Stata module for IV/GMM Poisson regression (Nichols 
2007). I run a simple OLS and a linear regression with an IV specification, using 
standardised counts as the dependent variable. I also run an alternative generalised 
linear model  (GLM) (Hardin and Carrol 2003) to check for the strength of the 
instrument and to address endogeneity concerns due to measurement errors.  
The results of the specifications are presented together with the results of 
diagnostics in Tables 14-17. The tests confirm the validity of the IV specification and 
the strength of the instrument when the urbanisation coefficient is instrumented with 
land revenue institutions, for both manufacturing and services. This is not the case 
when localisation is instrumented with land revenue institutions – where the F-
statistic is well below the rule-of-thumb value of 10. I also perform the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test to examine if endogeneity of urbanisation and localisation could have 
adverse effects on OLS estimates, and find that the results of the IV estimates are 
preferable. 
A comparison of the exponentiated coefficients from the Poisson models (3-
6), simple, instrumented and AGLM, shows that in the case of manufacturing, the 
coefficient on urbanisation and localisation remain relatively stable and remains 
significant in a few cases after instrumenting. In the case of services, after 
instrumenting with land revenue institutions, urbanisation ceases to be significant, 
whilst localisation has a much stronger negative effect. First stage results are reported 
in Table 18.  
 
 
6.1 Robustness check: Controlling for size 
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As a robustness check, I carry out the same exercise by differentiating between firms 
of different sizes. I divide the sample of enterprises into those that are small (i.e. 
employ less than 5 workers) and large (i.e. they employ more than 5 workers). In the 
case of unorganised manufacturing, almost 90 per cent of the firms in the sample, thus 
defined, are small-scale enterprises. For informal services, small-scale enterprises 
account for 93 per cent of the sample. The sample could also be divided into own-
account enterprises (OAE) and establishments. Own-account enterprises do not 
employ any hired workers on a regular basis, whilst establishment enterprises employ 
one or more workers on a regular basis. Around 68 per cent of all informal 
manufacturing, and approximately 70 per cent of all informal services enterprises are 
own-account enterprises.  
When I compare manufacturing firms by their sizes, I make a few interesting 
observations. Localisation economies continue to have a strong negative effect on 
small-scale or own-account enterprises. In addition, these enterprises are attracted to 
those they sell to but not those they buy from, unlike their larger counterparts (see 
‘Establishments’) that also seem to be attracted to their intermediate suppliers. Most 
importantly, the size of the district, i.e. the population explains an important part of 
what makes a location attractive to small-scale and OAE enterprises.  
Some of these results also hold for small-scale or OAE informal services 
enterprises. Localisation continues to have a negative and significant effect – 
implying that new births do not take place in locations with more existing firms in the 
same sector. Services firm, irrespective of their size seem to be co-located with those 
they supply to. But smaller enterprises are now also attracted to intermediate 
suppliers, as are establishments. The level of industrial diversity has a positive impact 
on all establishments, except those with more than 6 workers, where the result is 
insignificant. Access to electricity has a positive impact and again, the size of the 
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district makes a location more attractive to small-scale and OAE enterprises and 
establishments.  
In summary, the results are broadly similar to those obtained before, except 
that the impact of certain factors seems to be stronger for small-scale firms than for 
larger establishments in the data. In their analysis of Italian firms Lafourcade and 
Mion (2003) also find that small firms are more spatially concentrated than large ones 
and are more sensitive to input-output linkages. Additionally, as the data is unable to 
differentiate between formal and informal services, controlling for the size of the firm 
provides a reasonable approximation of informality, and excludes large services 
enterprises that are not formally registered under the Factories Act, but which in all 
other ways are run like formal-sector enterprises.  
 
 
6.2 Unorganised versus organised 
 
I also carry out the same exercise for the organised manufacturing and services sector 
in India, to check how the results differ. I use data for both manufacturing and 
services firms from the Prowess database, and data from the Annual Survey of 
Industries (ASI) for manufacturing firms. Prowess is a corporate database that 
contains normalised data built on a sound understanding of disclosures of over 18,000 
companies in India. The ASI contains data on over 140,000 manufacturing firms in 
India. I then re-run the regressions for new firms for the two cross-sections – 1999-
2000 and 2004-2005. Although I carry out the regressions using Poisson, zero-inflated 
and zero-truncated methods, I only report the results of the negative binomial 
specifications16. This facilitates comparison, but more importantly the negative 
                                                   
16 Results from the models are available on request.  
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binomial models exhibit the best goodness-of-fit statistics. As before, the coefficients 
are reported as Incidence Rate Ratios for ease of interpretation.  
Since I have data on much fewer firms when using the Prowess dataset for the 
organised sector, most of the predictor variables are no longer significant. The effect 
of localisation is no longer negative, nor significant, with regards to organised 
services industry17 – contrast this with the negative and significant effect for 
unorganised services for the same variable. This could be since formal services 
consist mostly of finance, insurance, IT firms etc, which may benefit more from 
knowledge spillovers when in proximity to one another, as compared to informal 
services firms, such as small shop-keepers, rickshaw drivers etc, which would suffer 
from higher competition with more proximity. Supplier linkages, i.e. proximity to 
those industries to which a formal service firm sells its products to, also make a 
location more attractive – this is similar to the positive and significant results for 
informal services. Data on formal manufacturing from the ASI provide some evidence 
of positive spillovers from locating close to firms within the same industry. There is 
also evidence that formal manufacturing firms like locating close to those they source 
from, but not necessarily close to those they supply to. The effect of 
telecommunications, education or power infrastructure is not consistent across 
different years. The size (population) of a district has a strong positive effect on 
formal services industries, which is interesting, but seems to have a negative effect on 
formal manufacturing. The latter could be explained by urban regulations that prevent 
heavy industries from clustering near large population settlements in cities and towns.  
One might also expect that the rate of informal activity would be higher in 
places where there are barriers to entry to formal activity. In other words, it may be 
                                                   
17 This result is also similar to the coefficient on large-scale services enterprises (see Table 
20), providing evidence that large service enterprises are run just like other formal sector 
enterprises registered under the Factories Act.  
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possible that informal activity serves as a substitute to the formal sector. If this were 
the case, one might expect to see a negative correlation between the informal and 
formal firm births. In the data, I find that both the count and the rate of new firm 
activity are positively correlated at the geographical level of the state and that of the 
district. And so I investigate the inter-linkages between the types of sectors that could 
be driving these correlations.  
 
6.3  Measures of co-agglomeration 
 
 
While the data treats formal and informal manufacturing and services as separate 
units, in reality these firms are inter-linked in a number of ways. The agglomeration 
variables (localisation, input, output and urbanisation) have been constructed taking 
total employment, i.e. across the formal and informal sector, into account. However, 
this does not tell us anything about the linkages between and across formal and 
informal, manufacturing and services firms. Following Ellison and Glaeser (1997, 
2010) I compute pair-wise coagglomeration measures for all 2-digit industries for 
manufacturing and services, across the organised and the unorganised sector (see 
Appendix A for construction of the Index). I have at my disposal data from four 
different sources: organised manufacturing data comes from the Annual Survey of 
Industries, unorganised manufacturing and services data comes from two different 
surveys of the National Sample Survey Organisation, and organised services data 
comes from the Prowess database.  
Clearly, the Prowess database contains very few firm observations as 
compared to data from the NSSO and the ASI. I use the Annual Survey of Industries 
instead of Prowess for manufacturing firms, as the former is a richer source of data, 
even though the latter contains data on manufacturing units. Since Prowess accounts 
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for such a small proportion of firms in the sample, using this database gives an 
inflated value of coagglomeration. In other words, owing to the small size of these 
sectors when data for total employment in pooled, and the small number of firms in 
the dataset causes the coagglomeration index to be very volatile. Thus, I drop data 
from Prowess, and construct coagglomeration measures using the remaining 
databases. Subsequently, I am unable to construct coagglomeration measures for 
formal services. Table 23 lists the 20 most coagglomerated sectors. Similar to the EG 
agglomeration index, the no-coagglomeration benchmark is when the value of the 
index is zero (i.e. 
€ 
E(γ) = 0). In general, if the EG coagglomeration index is greater 
than 0.05, the industries are considered to be highly concentrated.  
Certain coaggomerations, such as office and computing maintenance and 
market research activities with education, i.e. primary, secondary, distance learning 
education activities, seems intuitive – one might expect these industries to use similar 
labour pools.  However, others, such as the coagglomeration of manufactures of 
apparel with education, or that of recreational and entertainment activities with 
recycling, is not clear.  
Earlier results found that buyer-supplier linkages explained a large proportion 
of new informal activity within a district. I will now verify to what extent these 
linkages are correlated with the final coagglomeration indices observed in my data. 
Whilst the earlier analysis made no distinction between organised and unorganised 
industries, this analysis teases out the importance of each type of activity (i.e. formal 
or informal) for each type of industry (i.e. manufacturing and services). To relate the 
measure of coagglomeration to a single measure of linkages between a pair of 
industries, I follow Ellison et al (2010) and construct an input-output index (see 
Appendix A for construction of the Index). I then relate this single measure for each 
pair of industry to the coagglomeration measure also constructed for each pair on 
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industry – except that the latter are also constructed separately for formal and 
informal manufacturing. The table below provides the correlation values for each pair 
of coagglomerated industries with the standard input-output index.  
Since I do not have data on labour market pooling and knowledge spillovers, 
in this section I try to discern the effect of input-output spillovers only. A major 
limitation of the EG index is that it does not distinguish between spillovers and 
natural advantages to explain the coagglomeration of firms – and I will thus be unable 
to single out the effect of buyer-supplier linkages from that of natural advantage. A 
high correlation may be an indication that the pair of industries are coagglomerated 
owing to input-output linkages, while a low correlation may be an indication that 
other factors, such as say, labour market pooling or technological spillovers may 
underlie the observed coagglomeration.  
I find that although coagglomeration and input-output linkages are positively 
associated, the level of correlation is quite low. Coagglomeration between formal 
manufacturing and formal and informal manufacturing and services does seem to 
have some correlation with the standard input-output measures, perhaps indicating 
that these buyer-supplier linkages may explain the coagglomeration to some extent. 
Interestingly, the standard input-output measure is negatively associated with the 
coagglomeration of formal services with itself – implying that other linkages may be 
more important. The same outcome is true for coagglomeration of informal services.  
It could also be argued that input-output linkages and coagglomeration are 
endogenous – in other words, firms may use the outputs of (or sell to) particular 
sectors simply because these sectors are coagglomerated. If it is assumed that input-
output linkages are determined by given production technologies and that the national 
input-output vectors are representative at the local scale, then I can rule out scenarios 
in which firms would adjust their inputs or outputs according to what was locally 
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available. If this were true, I would also expect to find a higher correlation between 
my measures of input-output linkages and coagglomeration. 
The results for input and output linkages to explain the attractiveness of a 
location to informal manufacturing activity was significant and positive – in other 
words, being located closer to buyers or suppliers made a location more attractive to 
new units. The coagglomeration exercise conducted above shows that input-output 
linkages are in fact positively correlated with the EG measure of coagglomeration, 
which is what I would expect in light of my earlier results. Similarly, with regards to 
informal services, although input linkages made a location more attractive to new 
informal services units, output linkages had a negative effect. The standard input-
output measure in the above analysis is an un-directional measure of the input and 
output variables and thus it could be capturing the negative effect of output linkages 
found in the earlier regression analysis.  
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
 
This paper seeks answers to the following question: What factors influence the spatial 
distribution of informal economic activity within India? The main aim of the paper is 
to understand what drives the process of spatial variations in industrial activity, i.e. in 
identifying the factors that determine location decisions. It is important to understand 
why economic activity tends to concentrate geographically because if one can explain 
geographic concentration, then one can go some way towards explaining important 
aspects of international trade and economic growth. The importance of this research is 
underscored by two inter-related factors – that the clustering of economic activity has 
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important implications for economic development and that the contribution of the 
informal sector to economic growth and employment makes it a potent tool in 
influencing regional economic policy.   
The empirical analysis finds that economic geography factors have an 
important effect on informal firms’ performance, and thus their decision to locate in a 
particular area. In the case of formal manufacturing in India, Lall and Mengistae 
(2005) find that there is a pattern in the data whereby geographically disadvantaged 
cities seem to compensate partially for their natural disadvantage by having a better 
business environment than more geographically advantaged locations. The findings in 
this paper are that economic geography factors, such as input-output economies, do in 
fact positively impact the attractiveness of a district to new informal activity, whilst 
localisation seems to be capturing competition, and so it has a negative and significant 
effect. The analysis finds that the presence of education and telecommunications 
infrastructure seems to matter little. This is an indication that governments may be 
limited in their ability to narrow regional disparities in hosting of informal economic 
activity, which is a source of growth and employment.  
This research also makes an important contribution to the empirical literature 
on industrial development and economic geography. To my knowledge, there are no 
papers that have examined the location of informal industry, although a handful study 
the effects of agglomeration economies and business environment on the spatial 
concentration of manufacturing in emerging countries. In large developing countries 
the informal sector accounts for an important proportion of domestic product and 
employment, and any study that does not account for the sector is scarcely 
representative. In addition, whilst the theoretical development of new economic 
geography has received much attention in the literature, there is still much scarcity of 
empirical tests for developing countries.  
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In addition the use of land revenue institutions as an instrument helps to rule 
out omitted variables bias by controlling for the difference between first and second 
nature economic geography, although these instruments are far from perfect. In 
summary, this paper provides evidence of the validity of the forces emphasised by 
new economic geography and location theory approaches. The study does not attempt 
to perfect the theory of economic geography, but it does attempt to confront the 
existing tenets with data on unorganised industry in India. 
The policy implications of the research and its findings are of significant 
importance – policy-makers need to have an understanding of the relative importance 
of existing agglomeration economies and business environment if they are interested 
in influencing the decisions of informal activity. With the importance of this sector 
and its potential effect on employment and economic growth, such an understanding 
could provide a powerful tool for spreading growth and employment to 
geographically less-advantaged regions. This analysis finds that governments may 
find it an uphill task to encourage informal economic activity to locate to regions that 
it has not previously favoured.  
 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1: Share of unorganised activity (2002-03) 
Industry Organised  
(% of NDP) 
Unorganised 
(% of NDP) 
Total  
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 4.1 95.9 100 
Mining, manufacturing, 
electricity and construction 
60.5 39.5 100 
Services  53.1 46.9 100 
Total  43.3 56.7 100 
Source: National Account Statistics 2005 
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Table 2: Distribution of Employment (2004-2005) 
    
Number of 
workers 
(millions) 
Distribution 
of workers 
(%) 
Agriculture Organised 6.1 2.4 
  Unorganised 252.8 97.6 
   258.9 100 
Non-Agriculture Organised 56.5 28.4 
  Unorganised 142.1 71.6 
   198.5 100 
Total Organised 62.6 13.7 
  Unorganised 394.9 86.3 
    457.5 100 
Source: NSSO Sample Survey 2004-2005 
 
 
Table 3: Employment by sector (%) 
1983-84 1987-88 1993-94 1999-2000 
Industry Org Unorg Org Unorg Org Unorg Org Unorg 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.6 99.4 0.7 99.3 0.6 99.4 0.6 99.4 
Mining and quarrying 55.5 44.5 44.2 55.8 40.7 59.3 43.2 56.8 
Manufacturing 19.7 80.3 17.3 82.7 16.1 83.9 14.9 85.1 
Electricity, gas and water 90.7 9.3 71.3 28.7 69.7 30.3 79.0 21.0 
Construction 17.7 82.3 10.1 89.9 10 90 6.5 93.5 
Trade, hotels and restaurants 2.1 97.9 1.8 98.2 1.6 98.4 1.2 98.8 
Transport, storage and communication 38.8 61.2 34.8 65.2 29.7 70.3 21.5 78.5 
Services 40.3 59.7 36.8 63.2 31.7 68.3 34.8 65.2 
Source: Sakhtivel and Joddar 200618  
 
 
Table 4: Theil Index for the unorganised sector 
District Manu District Serv 
Mumbai 255.43  Kolkata 984.42 
Ludhiana 146.34  Mumbai 958.80 
South Tripura 100.84  Delhi 361.93 
Kolkata 80.03  Purba Champaran 248.53 
Delhi 52.53  Medinipur 226.19 
Ahmadabad 47.11  Ernakulam 175.90 
Jaipur 44.08  Pune 169.70 
South 24 Parganas 43.08  Thane 161.71 
Coimbatore 42.63  Bangalore 139.19 
West Tripura 42.19  Hyderabad 137.65 
Surat 39.93  Lucknow 131.88 
Thane 39.70  Kanpur Nagar 128.59 
                                                   
18  Organised employment figures are obtained from annual reports (1983 and 1988) and 
Quarterly Employment Review (1994 and 2000). 
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North 24 Parganas 39.52  West Tripura 104.66 
Haora 37.08  South 24 Parganas 99.99 
Murshidabad 36.44  Jammu 96.08 
Srinagar 34.17  Thiruvananthapuram 95.27 
Hyderabad 34.00  Madurai 92.67 
Varanasi 32.53  West Godavari 90.62 
Virudhunagar 31.18  North 24 Parganas 90.12 
Vellore 29.69   Barddhaman 86.76 
 
 
Table 5: Ellison-Glaeser Index (Unorganised Manufacturing) 
NIC Description EG Index 
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 0.204 
35 Other transport equipment 0.105 
32 Radio, television and communications equipment 0.069 
33 
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 0.045 
19 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags saddlery, harness and footwear 0.023 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus 0.021 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.017 
23 Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 0.016 
27 Basic metals 0.013 
16 Tobacco Products 0.012 
29 Machinery and equipment 0.010 
24 Chemical and chemical products 0.010 
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.009 
21 Paper and Paper products 0.008 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.008 
17 Textiles 0.007 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.006 
36 Furniture 0.004 
20 Wood and cork products (except furniture) 0.003 
28 
Fabricated metal products (except machinery and 
equipments) 0.003 
18 Wearing apparel; Dressing and dyeing of fur 0.002 
15 Food products and Beverages -0.007 
 
 
Table 6: Ellison-Glaeser Index (Unorganised Services) 
NIC Description EG Index 
73 Research and development 0.287 
61 Water transport 0.206 
72 Computer and related activities 0.099 
63 
Supporting and auxilliary transport activities; activities 
of travel agencies 0.015 
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar 0.013 
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activities 
70 Real estate activities 0.005 
91 Activities of membership organisations 0.004 
71 
Renting of machinery and equipment without operator 
and of personal and household goods 0.003 
74 Other business activities 0.003 
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 0.002 
80 Education 0.002 
93 Other service activities 0.002 
85 Health and social work 0.001 
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 0.001 
55 Hotels and restaurants 0.000 
64 Post and communications 0.000 
 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Expected 
sign   #   Mean 
    manufacturing services manufacturing services 
New firms   567 572 3,531 4,111 
Localisation + 557 469 0.003 0.002 
Input + 557 462 4213.2 3821.3 
Output + 557 462 2189.6 8237.7 
Urbanisation - 578 586 0.41 0.33 
Market Access + 574 582 869363 871313 
Education + 578 480 0.074 0.056 
Electricity + 578 486 0.633 0.559 
Telephone + 578 486 0.368 0.083 
Wealth + 578 486 0.051 0.054 
Wages -/+ 574 483 100.94 93.47 
Notes: # refers to the number of districts for which data is available. There are a total 
of 604 districts in the country.  
 
 
Table 8: Predictor Variables 
        Availability 
  Variable Indicator Source(s) 
1999-
2000 
2004-
2005 
Localisation Intra-industry concentration NSSO  √ √ 
Input/Output 
economies Buyer/Supplier linkages NSSO  √ √ 
Urbanisation Economic Diversity NSSO  √ √ 
Economic 
Geography 
Market Access Neighbouring markets 
Orthodromic distance 
calculations √ √ 
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Education 
Persons with a High-School 
education NSSO √ √ 
Electricity Persons with access to electricity NSSO √ √ 
Telephone 
Households with a telephone 
connection NSSO √ √ 
Wages Non-agricultural hourly wages NSSO √ √ 
Business 
Environment 
 
Wealth High-income households NSSO √ √ 
Notes: NSSO - National Sample Survey Organisation 
 
 
Table 9: Characteristics of the Data 
  
 
 
Services 
 
 
Manufacturing 
Variable # Mean Std. Dev. # Mean Std. Dev. 
count 586 4111.27 6749.53 578 3531.38 8207.68 
count>0 557 4325.32 6856.00 526 3880.49 8525.32 
Obs 586 0.0495 0.2171 578 0.0900 0.2864 
Fit_p 480 0.0000 0.0000 570 0.0000 0.0000 
Fit_nb 480 0.0066 0.0025 570 0.0325 0.0227 
Fit_zip 480 0.0250 0.0632 570 0.0842 0.1438 
 
 
Table 10: Manufacturing IRRs 
Variable Zero-truncated Negative Binomial 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Localisation 0.385***  0.382*** 
Input 4.207***  4.173*** 
Output 0.754***  0.772*** 
Urbanisation 0.859  0.84 
Market Access 1.101  1.064 
Education  0.882 1.217 
Telephone  0.700*** 1.029 
Electricity  1.181 0.622** 
Wages  1.162 0.826 
Wealth  1.048 1.021 
Population 1.856 2.019 3.149*** 
Employment 1.194 1.844  
# 3762 5975 3673 
Pseudo 
€ 
R2 0.022 0.011 0.023 
AIC 35199 47070.9 34608.6 
BIC 35460.8 47358.8 34894.2 
 Exponentiated coefficients 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 11: Services IRRs 
Variable Zero-truncated Negative Binomial 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Localisation 0.709***  0.711*** 
Input 1.240***  1.247*** 
Output 1.170***  1.169*** 
Urbanisation 0.678***  0.688*** 
Market Access 1.008  1.008 
Education  0.998 0.867 
Telephone  1.144*** 1.057 
Electricity  1.068 1.246** 
Wages  0.965 0.894 
Wealth  1.04 1.067 
Population 3.134*** 1.857*** 2.600*** 
Employment 0.700* 0.948 0.663* 
# 2655 5069 2594 
Pseudo 
€ 
R2 0.03 0.018 0.03 
AIC 35056.8 59430.2 34503.8 
BIC 35298 59704.5 34773.4 
 Exponentiated coefficients 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 12: Incidence Rate Ratios (Manufacturing19) 
Variable Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial 
Zero-
inflated 
Poisson 
Zero-
inflated 
Negative 
Binomial 
Zero-
truncated 
Poisson 
Zero-
truncated 
Negative 
Binomial 
Localisation 0.361*** 0.382*** 0.411*** 0.484*** 0.411*** 0.482*** 
Input 4.317*** 4.173*** 3.163*** 2.876*** 3.160*** 2.876*** 
Output 0.900*** 0.772*** 1.026*** 0.862** 1.026*** 0.864** 
Urbanisation 0.894*** 0.84 0.912*** 0.97 0.905*** 0.963 
Market Access 1.014*** 1.064 1.014*** 1.036 1.013*** 1.031 
Education 1.132*** 1.217 1.099*** 1.149 1.084*** 1.14 
Telephone 1.115*** 1.029 1.051*** 1.064 1.056*** 1.078 
Electricity 0.563*** 0.622** 0.544*** 0.630*** 0.540*** 0.632*** 
Wages 0.863*** 0.826 0.813*** 0.763 0.833*** 0.778 
Wealth 1.073*** 1.021 1.075*** 1.019 1.071*** 1.019 
Population 2.345*** 3.149*** 2.982*** 2.661*** 2.642*** 2.099** 
Employment 1.339***    1.159*** 1.259 
# 3673 3673 3673 3673 2046 2046 
                                                   
19 I exclude incidence rate ratios from the Zero-Inflated Poisson and Negative-Binomial 
models since convergence was not reached. 
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Pseudo 
€ 
R2 0.48 0.023   0.453 0.034 
AIC 3589192.7 34608.6 2635260.3 33597.5 2630313.1 29092.9 
BIC 3589366.6 34894.2 2635614.2 33957.6 2630566.1 29351.6 
Exponentiated coefficients 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 13: Incidence Rate Ratios (Services) 
Variable Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial 
Zero-
inflated 
Poisson 
Zero-
inflated 
Negative 
Binomial 
Zero-
truncated 
Poisson 
Zero-
truncated 
Negative 
Binomial 
Localisation 0.783*** 0.711*** 0.811*** 0.771*** 0.811*** 0.772*** 
Input 1.234*** 1.247*** 1.219*** 1.202*** 1.219*** 1.200*** 
Output 1.161*** 1.169*** 1.151*** 1.151*** 1.151*** 1.151*** 
Urbanisation 0.748*** 0.688*** 0.769*** 0.729*** 0.769*** 0.729*** 
Market Access 1.123*** 1.008 1.149*** 1.07 1.149*** 1.08 
Education 0.917*** 0.867 0.910*** 0.863* 0.910*** 0.855* 
Telephone 1.046*** 1.057 1.077*** 1.081* 1.077*** 1.085* 
Electricity 1.308*** 1.246** 1.248*** 1.187* 1.248*** 1.186* 
Wages 0.844*** 0.894 0.831*** 0.912 0.831*** 0.915 
Wealth 1.094*** 1.067 1.082*** 1.059 1.082*** 1.06 
Population 2.019*** 2.600*** 1.965*** 2.369*** 1.965*** 2.331*** 
Employment 0.686*** 0.663* 0.698*** 0.643** 0.698*** 0.647** 
# 2594 2594 2594 2594 2259 2259 
Pseudo 
€ 
R2 0.431 0.03   0.405 0.032 
AIC 2115024.8 34503.8 1942625.7 34135.4 1940842.9 32366.8 
BIC 2115288.5 34773.4 1942965.6 34481.2 1941100.4 32630 
Exponentiated coefficients 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 14: Manufacturing (Instrumented variable: urbanisation)  
Variables 
OLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
Poisson 
(3) 
IV Poisson 
(4) 
AGLM 
(Poisson) 
(5) 
AGLM 
(Negative 
Binomial) 
(6) 
Urbanisation 0.919 1.184 0.84 0.769** 0.891 0.763*** 
         
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# 3673 3673 3673 3673 3673 3673 
F-Stat  29.61     
Notes: For specifications (3), (4), (5) and (6), the dependent variable is raw counts; Exponentiated 
coefficients. For specifications (1) and (2) the dependent variable is standardised counts 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 15: Manufacturing (Instrumented variable: localisation)  
Variables 
OLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
Poisson 
(3) 
IV Poisson 
(4) 
AGLM 
(Poisson) 
(5) 
AGLM 
(Negative 
Binomial) 
(6) 
Localisation 0.756*** 0.439 0.382*** 0.361*** 0.0177 0.0368 
         
Other controls   yes yes yes yes 
# 3673 3673 3673 3673 3673 3673 
F-Stat  2.03     
Notes: For specifications (3), (4), (5) and (6), the dependent variable is raw counts; Exponentiated 
coefficients. For specifications (1) and (2) the dependent variable is standardised counts 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 16: Services (Instrumented variable: urbanisation)  
Variables 
OLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
Poisson 
(3) 
IV Poisson 
(4) 
AGLM 
(Poisson) 
(5) 
AGLM 
(Negative 
Binomial) 
(6) 
Urbanisation 0.671*** 0.385 0.688*** 2.344 0.973 3.585 
         
Other controls   yes yes yes yes 
# 3673 3673 3673 3673 3673 3673 
F-Stat  15.39     
Notes: For specifications (3), (4), (5) and (6), the dependent variable is raw counts; Exponentiated 
coefficients. For specifications (1) and (2) the dependent variable is standardised counts 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 17: Services (Instrumented variable: localisation)  
Variables 
OLS 
(1) 
2SLS 
(2) 
Poisson 
(3) 
IV Poisson 
(4) 
AGLM 
(Poisson) 
(5) 
AGLM (Negative 
Binomial) 
(6) 
Localisation 0.856*** 0.109 0.711*** 0.265*** 1.588 Failed to converge 
         
Other controls   yes yes yes yes 
# 2594 2594 2594 2594 2594 2594 
F-Stat  0.15     
Notes: For specifications (3), (4), (5) and (6), the dependent variable is raw counts; Exponentiated 
coefficients. For specifications (1) and (2) the dependent variable is standardised counts 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 18: First-Stage Results 
 Manufacturing Services 
 localisation urbanisation localisation urbanisation 
Land Revenue Institutions -0.062 0.132*** 0.028 0.103*** 
(Std. Error) (0.044) (0.024) (0.073) (0.026) 
Constant -16.755*** 2.541*** -17.393*** -0.556* 
 (0.587) (0.361) (0.853) (0.333) 
# 3673 3673 2594 2594 
€ 
R2 0.859 0.723 0.652 0.732 
 
 
Table 19: Manufacturing enterprises by size 
 Zero-truncated Negative BInomial 
 Small-scale Large-scale OAE Establishments 
Localisation 0.508*** 0.789* 0.443*** 0.705*** 
Input 2.635*** 1.491** 3.062*** 1.349*** 
Output 0.877** 1.083 0.862* 1.208** 
Urbanisation 1.129 0.808 1.094 0.942 
Market Access 1.064 1.705 1.061 0.966 
Education 1.15 0.749 1.111 1.106 
Telephone 1.024 1.057 1.017 1.402** 
Electricity 0.717** 0.501* 0.684** 0.762 
Wages 0.761* 1.391 0.775 0.918 
Wealth 1.026 1.052 1.02 0.978 
Population 1.815* 1.51 2.290** 0.997 
Employment 1.257 1.734 1.197 1.317 
# 2569 570 1539 1074 
Pseudo 
€ 
R2 0.028 0.029 0.035 0.022 
AIC 35322.5 6501.6 22141.7 13294.1 
BIC 35591.7 6679.7 22387.3 13508.2 
Exponentiated coefficients  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 20: Services enterprises by size 
 Zero-truncated Negative BInomial 
 Small-scale Large-scale OAE Establishments 
Localisation 0.789*** 0.843 0.791*** 0.744*** 
Input 1.189*** 1.367*** 1.189*** 1.112** 
Output 1.148*** 0.882* 1.147*** 1.205*** 
Urbanisation 0.755*** 1.345 0.765** 0.706*** 
Market Access 1.093 1.178 1.106 1.087 
Education 0.867* 1.241 0.875 0.841* 
Telephone 1.077* 1.104 1.047 1.179*** 
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Electricity 1.158* 1.389 1.189* 0.934 
Wages 0.892 1.412 0.922 0.945 
Wealth 1.037 0.895 1.058 1.014 
Population 2.175*** 2.542 2.299*** 2.387*** 
Employment 0.687* 0.380* 0.631* 0.789 
# 3834 495 2163 2166 
Pseudo 
€ 
R2 0.023 0.033 0.029 0.023 
AIC 50384.6 4820.9 30223 24487 
BIC 50672.2 4997.5 30484.3 24748.3 
 Exponentiated coefficients 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 21: Organised Manufacturing and Services 
  Services (Prowess) Manufacturing (ASI) 
Variable 1999 2004 1999 2004 
Localisation 0.971 0.951 1.305*** 1.117 
Input 1.225*** 1.200*** 0.768*** 0.857* 
Output 0.906*** 1.019 1.195*** 1.072 
Urbanisation 1.003 0.865* 0.439*** 1.174 
Market Access 0.988 0.966 2.361*** 0.744 
Education 0.888** 1.093 0.783 1.563 
Telephone 0.958 1.342*** 1.002 0.316* 
Electricity 1.177** 0.641*** 0.944 37.11* 
Wages 1.083 0.590*** 0.966 9.348*** 
Wealth 1.050* 0.95 0.783* 1.1 
Population 1.416* 1.870** 0.887 0.000153*** 
Employment 0.764* 0.552** 1.546 368.6** 
# 2477 2120 864 457 
Pseudo 
€ 
R2 0.049 0.055 0.163 0.102 
AIC 13243.9 11321.4 2588.5 1226.2 
BIC 13464.8 11536.4 2745.7 1341.7 
Exponentiated coefficients 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 22: Industry Data Sources 
Type Source Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Organised ASI 40694 8.42 8.42 
Organised Prowess (manufacturing) 684 0.14 8.56 
Organised Prowess (services) 367 0.08 8.64 
Unorganised NSSO (manufacturing) 80591 16.67 25.31 
Unorganised NSSO (Services) 361040 74.69 100 
Total   483376 100   
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Table 23: Most Coagglomerated Industries 
Industry1 Type* Industry2  Type 
Coagg 
index 
Apparel and fur  Or Education  Unor 0.2321 
Repair/Maintenance of office and 
computing equipment  Unor Education  Unor 0.1715 
Education  Unor 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping 
etc  Or 0.1429 
Recreation, motion picture, TV, radio 
activities  Or Recycling  Or 0.1274 
Medical, precision and optical instruments  Unor 
Repair/Maintenance of office and 
computing equipment  Or 0.1009 
Apparel and fur  Or 
Repair/Maintenance of office and 
computing equipment  Unor 0.0791 
Apparel and fur  Or 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping 
etc  Or 0.0669 
R&D  Unor 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping 
etc  Or 0.0611 
Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation  Or Leather  Or 0.0574 
Office, accounting and computing 
equipment Unor 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping 
etc  Or 0.0523 
Coke and refined petroleum  Or Collection, purification distribution of water  Or 0.0511 
Repair/Maintenance of office and 
computing equipment  Unor 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping 
etc  Or 0.0509 
Radio, TV, Communication Equipment  Or 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping 
etc  Or 0.0464 
Auxiliary transport, storage and 
warehousing  Unor 
Auxilliary transport, storage and 
warehousing  Or 0.0445 
Furniture, jewellary, musical instruments etc  Or 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping 
etc  Or 0.0427 
Repair/Maintenance of office and 
computing equipment  Unor 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping 
etc  Or 0.0417 
Sea, coastal, inland water transport  Unor Leather  Unor 0.0390 
Furniture, jewellary, musical instruments etc  Or Radio, TV, Communication Equipment  Unor 0.0387 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping 
etc Or 
Office, accounting and computing 
equipment  Or 0.0380 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping 
etc  Or Medical, precision and optical instruments  Or 0.0377 
*Type refers to the organised (Or) or unorganised (Unor) sector 
 
 
Table 24: Coagglomeration and input-output correlations 
Industry 1 Industry 2 
Correlation 
Index 
Formal Manufacturing Formal Manufacturing 0.0531 
Formal Manufacturing Formal Services 0.0688 
Formal Manufacturing Informal Manufacturing 0.0536 
Formal Manufacturing Informal Services 0.0529 
Formal Services Formal Services -0.0382 
Formal Services Informal Manufacturing 0.0771 
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Formal Services Informal Services 0.0175 
Informal Manufacturing Informal Manufacturing 0.0314 
Informal Services Informal Services -0.0271 
Informal Manufacturing Informal Services 0.0502 
 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Share of activity as a % of sectoral NDP (2002-03) 
 
Source: National Account Statistics 2005 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Informal Activity 
Manufacturing     Services 
 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organisation (GAUL) and Prowess 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Informal Activity (with controls) 
Manufacturing     Services 
 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organisation (GAUL), Prowess, Census 2001 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Informal Activity (contribution to the Theil Index) 
Manufacturing     Services 
 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organisation (GAUL), Prowess, Census 2001 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Ellison and Glaeser (1997) Index: 
 
The EG Index for industry 
€ 
k  is equal to: 
 
 
 
 
where G for industry 
€ 
k  is defined as: 
 € 
γ k =
G − 1 − xj2
j
∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ Hk
1 − xj2
j
∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 1 −Hk( )
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€ 
G = s jk − x j( )
2
 
 
and 
€ 
s refers to the share of total employment of district
€ 
j  for industry 
€ 
k , 
€ 
x  refers to 
the share of district 
€ 
j  in total employment, and 
€ 
H  is the plant employment Herfindahl 
index, corresponding to the sum of the squares of the share of employment of each 
plant over the total employment of the industry. 
 
 
Theil Index: 
 
The Theil index for specialisation here measures the extent of over or under 
representation of a district with regards to employment across a set of industries. The 
value of the index is20: 
 
€ 
Tr =
x jk
x jk
∑ log
x jk
x j
− log xkx
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟  
 
where: 
 
€ 
x jk refers to employment in industry 
€ 
k  in district 
€ 
j  
€ 
x j  refers to total employment in district 
€ 
j  
€ 
xk  refers to total employment in industry 
€ 
k  
€ 
x  refers to total employment  
 
 
Ellison and Glaeser (2010) Coagglomeration Index: 
 
The EG coagglomeration index applies to industry pairs, and for industries 
€ 
i  and 
€ 
j  it 
is defined as: 
 
€ 
γ ij
c =
(smi − xm )(smj − xm )m=1
M
∑
1− xm2m=1
M
∑
 
 
where 
€ 
m  indexes geographic areas (here, districts), 
€ 
smi  is the share of industry 
€ 
i’s 
employment contained in area 
€ 
m , 
€ 
xm  measures the aggregate size of area 
€ 
m  (which 
is modelled as the mean employment share in the district across 
manufacturing/services industries).  
 
Ellison and Glaeser (2010) Input-Output Index: 
 
€ 
Inputi← j  is defined at the share of industry 
€ 
i’s inputs that come from industry 
€ 
j .  
€ 
Outputi→ j  is defined as the share of industry 
€ 
i’s outputs that are sold to industry 
€ 
j . 
To construct a proxy for the linkages between a pair of industries, I follow Ellison et 
al (2010) and define unidirectional versions of the input and output variables by: 
                                                   
20 See Brakman et al (2005) for more on the calculation of the index for concentration.  
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€ 
Inputij =max Inputi← j ,Input j← i{ } and 
€ 
Outputij =max Outputi→ j ,Output j→ i{ }  
 
The combined variable is then defined as: 
 
€ 
InputOutputij =max Inputij ,Outputij{ } 
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